

20 MAR 1958

PURPOSE FOR: Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT: Requirements and workload in the Administration Building  
Printing Plant

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Chief, Management Staff from Deputy  
Director (Support) dated 10 December 1957, subject:  
Personnel Ceiling, Office of Logistics (TAB A)

Paragraph 5 of this staff study contains recommendations for the  
approval of the Deputy Director (Support).

1. PROBLEM:

Can adjustments be made in the requirements levied on the Administration  
Building Printing Plant to eliminate or minimize its workload problem?

2. FACTS:

The requirements levied on the Administration Building Printing Plant  
(Admin. Plant) fall into 3 basic categories: National Intelligence  
Survey Program (NIS) requirements, CIA (non-NIS) requirements and  
requirements from other agencies. Further, the workload problem in the  
Admin. Plant is directly related to the size of the staff available  
to fulfill requirements.

a. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PROGRAM

- (1) Requirements in support of the National Intelligence Survey  
Program (NIS) now account for about 60% of the workload of  
the Admin. Plant (TAB J).
- (2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff set the requirements and allocate the  
priorities for production of the NIS on an annual basis (TAB B).  
The requirements have not been changed since they were reduced  
in 1956 from 15 NIS to 8 NIS or 500 equivalent sections per  
year. (The NIS Section is the production unit used in this  
study.)
- (3) The Clark Task Force has reaffirmed the need for and the worth  
of the NIS program in the Hoover Commission Report on Intelligence  
Activities (TAB B).

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- (4) Discussions with the Assistant to the DCI (Admin.) reveal that, even under personnel ceiling pressures, the DCI has been reluctant to allow up production of HIS Sections as the majority completed are in the maintenance stage and the program will suffer if maintenance is not kept reasonably current.
- (5) Although more than 40 government activities contribute to the HIS, the principal contributors are State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA.

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- (6) Contributing agencies have eliminated various departmental intelligence publications which are replaced by the HIS and are placing increasing reliance on the HIS program. It is an established fact that each international crisis or major disturbance results in urgent requests for HIS on the areas involved.

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- (7) As the substantive quality of the HIS has improved, the amounts of tabular work, charts and color printing have steadily increased in number, requiring more resources to process.

- (8) The average number of HIS Sections sent to the plant per month in calendar years 1955, 1956, and 1957 were 36.2, 39 and 43.3 respectively. The average number published per month for the same periods were 1955 = 41.6, 1956 = 42.4 and 1957 = 38. (See TABS G & H)

- (9) New priorities or required completion dates have been established (18 in calendar year 1956 and 10 in calendar year 1957), but much pressure has been exerted on the PSC by OAS to get the backlog of HIS Sections down and to reduce the average printing time required. (TAB C)

- (10) The backlog of HIS Sections in the plant fluctuated between 30 and 179 during calendar years 1955 and 1956. In 1957 it rose steadily from a low of 31 in January to a high of 211 in September. At December 31, 1957 the backlog amounted to 204 HIS Sections (TAB C) (For similar statistics by folio see TAB H).

## b. CIA (HIS-HIS) REQUIREMENTS

Format - single manuscript page, single sheet of graphics, or one map.

- (1) There are no separate figures available for CIA (non-HIS) printing for periods prior to the 1<sup>st</sup> January 1957 takeover of the Admin. Plant by CIA.
- (2) Printing done for CIA (non-HIS) since 1 January 1957 amounted to 13% of total production for the year (TAB J).

C. OTHER AGENCY REQUIREMENTS:

Printing done for other Agencies in proportion to total production in the last 3 years (TAB J) is as follows:

1955, 1 Jan. - 31 Dec. 20%  
1956, 1 Jan. - 31 Dec. 20%  
1957, 1 Jan. - 31 Dec. 6%

D. CHARTERS RELATED TO REQUIREMENTS

- (1) The Public Printer, in his letter of 5 December 1956 to the Director of CIA (TAB I 2), stated:

"It is my opinion that the interests of the Government will be served best by transferring the operations of this plant to the Central Intelligence Agency in view of the impending relocation and your plan to consolidate this plant with other printing units now operated by your Agency."

- (2) In January 1957 the Printing Services Division had a ceiling of [REDACTED] of these slots were in the Admin. Plant and 9 of them were frozen thus reducing the effective working ceiling in the Admin. Plant [REDACTED]. In August the PSD ceiling was cut by 11 slots. In January 1958 this cut was allocated among the components of PSD leaving the present working ceiling at [REDACTED] as follows:

Office of Chief Administrative Staff	[REDACTED]
Administrative Plant	[REDACTED]
1 E. 23rd., 2 E. 24th., 2 Duke Street Plants	[REDACTED]
Total	[REDACTED]

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- (3) The Acting Director of Logistics stated on 14 November 1957 that:

"Experience with the Admin. Plant plainly indicates that

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[REDACTED] employees will be an absolute minimum with which the plant can operate" (TAB A). On the basis of subsequent experience, the Chief, NSC has stated that one additional low cost laborer, (or a total of [REDACTED] which he believes is still a minimum figure), would relieve highly skilled personnel from working at tasks considerably below their qualifications and will help to reduce overtime costs.

- (4) AD/HI, [REDACTED] on 13 February 1958, in a memorandum for the Director of Logistics, subject NIS Printing Situation, paragraph 3, stated (TAB E 6):

"I am aware of your continued efforts to improve the NIS printing situation, and note that considerable progress was made this past month in turning out NIS Sections. I believe, however, that no satisfactory solution of this problem is possible without an increase in the staff of the Administration building Plant to the level that was maintained under GPO administration."

- (5) Average personnel on duty were: [REDACTED] and 1957 [REDACTED] (TAB E). The available figures for personnel on duty prior to the takeover show a fluctuation between [REDACTED]. Personnel on duty from shortly after the takeover to date fluctuated between [REDACTED]. An explanation of these figures and their significance is attached as part of TAB G.

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- (6) It is necessary for almost all personnel who work in the Admin. Plant to have Q clearance. There is also a Q-cleared pool of GPO employees who were used to augment the Admin. Plant staff during peak periods before CIA took over the plant, some of whom by special agreement were on detail to CIA until as late as November 1957.

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### 3. DISCUSSION:

#### a. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PROGRAM

- (1) The JCS, the Clark Task Force and the DD/I appear to be convinced of the validity of the NIS requirements. It would be possible, of course, to again raise the question at the JCS level; however, the action which produced the reduction in 1959 was taken on the basis of contributor capabilities and it is not likely that a reduction on the basis of printing capabilities would be approved at this time.

- (2) The NIS program has always shown a peak and valley production situation originating with the contributing agencies including CIA (TABS D & E). TABS # 1, 2 and 3 show that in FY 1955, 1956 and 1957 roughly half of each year's total production by the contributing agencies was outstanding at the beginning of the last quarter of the year with twice as many sections submitted to OMI in June of each year as in any other single month. Much effort has been made to smooth out this production month. Much effort has been made to smooth out this production problem, but the very nature of the program indicates there will always be somewhat of a year end peak. TABS # 4 & 5 show the production schedule for Fiscal Years 1957 and 1958. The schedule for 1958 shows much more evenly planned production than the one for 1957. It is anticipated that the constant attention this problem has had in receiving will result in improvement in smoothing out requirements on the Admin. Plant.
- (3) NIS contributor production varied in total amount per year from its beginning in Fiscal Year 1949 through FY 1974. The Fiscal Years 1955, 1956, and 1957 show relative stability with contributor production at approximately 8 NIS or 900 equivalent sections a year (TAB C).

The production of basic intelligence is a service of concern concern which provides the foundation for the development of all other intelligence and is useful only to the extent that the production reaches the consumer in timely fashion. Because of pressures from contributors and using agencies and departments and because of the current nature of much of the intelligence, OMI attempts to produce a finished product within four months using overtime in lieu of staffing to meet peak requirements. This has meant that at the end of each fiscal year there has been a backlog in OMI which has been reduced by using overtime and which is reflected in the Admin. Plant two or three months later. Large amounts of overtime in the Admin. Plant were not necessary as long as OPC administered it because OPC detailed additional people to the Plant during peak periods.

When CIA took over the plant this flexibility was no longer available and the backlog in the plant showed an almost continuous rise during calendar year 1957 (TABS G & H). Both OMI and the Admin. Plant consider 100 NIS sections to be an acceptable workload and backlog for each. Admittedly the reduction in the workload and backlog during the summer of 1957 by OMI of its seasonal backlog during the summer of 1957 resulted in the largest peak in NIS Sections submitted to the plant in three years. (September 1957 - 60 sections) (TAB G).

The backlog immediately prior to this submission was more than 170 sections, while at the same time June, July and August showed the lowest number of people on duty in more than three years.

- (4) The "deadline situations" referred to in conversations are not directed at OBT priorities or completion dates but rather at the pressures brought to bear on the Admin. Plant by OBT to:
- (a) reduce the backlog which accumulated in calendar year 1957, and (b) reduce the average time required to print an MIS section from the calendar year 1957 average of 92.5 days to approximately 60 days. Priority and deadline (completion date) material from OBT amounted to 3.5% of total MIS production in 1957 but the backlog rose from 91 sections in January 1957 to a high of 224 sections in September 1957. At 31 January 1958 a high of 192 sections, 92 above the acceptable level of 100. While the annual MIS production requirements as approved by the JCS amount to 3 equivalent MIS (500 equivalent sections) per year and do not require a precise monthly production, it is obviously impossible to produce this number unless tentative month-by-month production goals are set and adhered to as far as possible. An annual production of 500 equivalent MIS requires an average monthly production of approximately 41.7 MIS Sections. OBT has indicated that there would be no problems in, for example, a one month's production of 30 sections, and a following month's production amounting to between 50 and 55 sections and sections remaining in the printing plant an average of about 40 days.

#### b. CIA (NON-MIS) PRODUCTION

- (1) The 13% of total Admin. Plant production for calendar year 1957 involves many components of CIA and varied kinds of work. A detailed analysis of these factors would cost more work, than the probable results would warrant. However, some of the 13% was filler work which was needed during the first half of the year to avoid idle manhours in the Admin. Plant.
- (2) The largest single user in the CIA (NON-MIS) category is the Cartographic Division of OBT. The Chief of the Cartographic Division has stated that he will increase his effort to control re-runs of published maps and other non-priority map printing so that it can be done during slack time at the Admin. Plant.

c. OTHER AGENCY REQUIREMENTS

- (1) The requirements to provide support (beyond that of the ABC program) to other agencies was one of the conditions of the transfer of the Admin. Plant to CIA. The Director, in his letter of 19 November 1956 to the Public Printer, paragraph 2, states:

"the Central Intelligence Agency shall provide classified printing at cost to the Atomic Energy Commission, the State Department, and any other agency which heretofore has used the subject plant for classified printing to the extent that such service may have been previously furnished by the Government Printing Office." (underscoring added)

The Public Printer and the Joint Committee on Printing made this a condition of the transfer (TAB I 1, 2, 3).

- (2) It is estimated by the Production Chief of the Admin. Plant that about 70% of the reduction (from 20% to 6% of total production) in printing for other agencies was caused by discontinuance of printing for the Air Force. Air Force printing was taken over by GPO at about the time of the take-over by CIA of the Admin. Plant. A substantial part of the rest of the reduction was in unclassified printing for ABC and the State Department. Chief, PPD states:

"Because of the very fine relationship between the Administration Building Printing Plant and its customers, the Plant has, when heavy backlog existed, arranged not to do unclassified work for these customers. Such work was not the type included under the terms of the agreement. In some cases it was necessary to negotiate satisfactory delivery dates for the classified work which was done because requested deadlines could not be met. There is no record of any complaint by any customer agency of the service provided by the Plant."

d. STAFFING RELATED TO REQUIREMENTS

- (1) With the takeover of the Admin. Plant by CIA in January 1957, the workload and overtime problem became of direct concern to CIA.
- (2) CIA has agreed with the Public Printer and Joint Committee on Printing to consolidate the [redacted] and Admin Building plants.

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because of their physical locations both plants have substantially duplicate administrative and supervisory structures. This is genuine to this study because ceiling requirements are one of the considerations in the workload problem of the Admin. Plant and consolidation of the two plants would release slots (supervisory and clerical) which could then be used to increase the productive capacity of the Admin. Plant without any increase in ceiling. Additionally consolidation would provide greater flexibility and efficiency in the use of all P&D assets, both people and equipment. This, however, is at least 3 years away.

- (3) During the calendar year 1977 the percent of total work done for the Agency increased but was offset by a decrease in work done for other agencies. At the same time the number of people available to do the work dropped significantly (TAB C). This, plus the fact that CTA eliminated its own backlog, accounts for the backlog now in the plant which is gradually being reduced. It should be recognized that this has been an annual occurrence for at least the last three years. Chief P&D has stated that once this backlog is reduced, and if the CTA submissions can be controlled, he believes the Admin. Plant could handle the printing requirements placed on it now with a minimum staff and "a moderate amount" of overtime. (Overtime in calendar 1976 amounted to 2 man years. In calendar 1977 overtime amounted to between 9 and 10 man years.)
- STATINTL (4) During calendar year 1977 the people on duty in the Admin Plant averaged [redacted] including details. The number of productive hours worked would have required a staff of [redacted] to perform without overtime. In the peak and valley situation in this plant it is not desirable for obvious reasons, to staff up to meet peak periods. The effective working ceiling of the plant is now [redacted]. Chief P&D has recommended a 1/3 of [redacted] which would require release of 6 of the 9 frozen slots, but would still be 1 fewer people than the average on-duty strength for the year prior to CTA take-over of the plant. Although the plant could possibly be operated effectively with a bare minimum of [redacted] people, the addition of one laborer position (to a total of [redacted]) would be very desirable because highly skilled personnel would be relieved from unskilled work which they otherwise would be required to perform, their overtime costs would be reduced by much more than the cost of one laborer, and overtime hours could be further reduced.
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- (5) Since the peak period for HIS contributor submissions is June (TAB E) and the peak period for GPO submissions to the Plant is generally 2 or 3 months later (TAB F), the peak periods in the plant generally are in late summer and fall when Congress is not in session and Chief, PSD believes that GPO could detail already cleared personnel to the Admin. Plant without undue hardship. Such personnel could be reimbursed with .06 funds, and the plant has a long history of needing and receiving such assistance on a sporadic basis. Chief, PSD would like to avoid the necessity of making for such assistance but agrees it is one alternative course of action.
- (6) Other possibilities lie in the area of reduction of overall requirements levied on PSD in order to release slots for the Admin. Plant. For example, Chief, PSD is currently making efforts in this direction by studying the practicability of the use of a revolving fund and the possibilities of printing the [REDACTED] and other printing commercially. He states that commercial printing of [REDACTED] would permit discontinuance of the entire night shift [REDACTED] and release of 10 slots.

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4. CONCLUSIONS:

- a. In view of the JCS policy on requirements, the interpretation of that policy by the NM/L, the conclusions of the Clark Committee in this matter, and the increasing reliance being placed on the HIS by all contributing and using agencies and departments, it is not feasible to reduce the level of HIS requirements.
- b. The increased use of tables, charts, maps and color printing to improve readability and usability of the HIS is in line with current trends in production of all types of intelligence and the additional expense involved is small when compared to the total cost of collecting and producing such intelligence.
- c. All of the pressures consonant with good judgment are being brought to bear on contributor agencies in order to smooth out the contributor peak and valley situation.
- d. Although GPO records are not available for the years 1955 and 1956, discussion with PSD personnel and comparison of their best estimates with the records for 1957, indicates that there was no substantial increase in total workload in the Admin. Building Plant during calendar year 1957. There was an increase in HIS sections submitted to the plant (TABS G & H) but the overall HIS requirements have not increased.

- a. The major factor responsible for the workload problem at the Minin Plant is the reduction during calendar year 1977 of personnel in the Minin Plant to below any acceptable minimum and considerably below any on-duty strength prior to the takeover. This has reduced the production capacity of the plant to the point where requirements cannot now be met without excessive overtime.
- b. The unavailability of informal details between GPO and the Plant since the takeover by CIA has impaired the flexibility of plant production capacity.

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- c. Although [redacted] had been estimated as the "absolute minimum" staffing for the Minin Plant, careful review of the current staffing pattern and comparison of it with the staffing pattern at the time CIA took over the plant shows an imbalance between skilled and unskilled labor. It has been necessary to assign skilled personnel to perform unskilled labor which has resulted in reducing total skilled productive hours by at least one skilled worker. Approval of an additional laborer slot would permit proportionally more skilled productive hours to be used to reduce overtime and backlog and maintain them at an acceptable level.
- d. NIS priorities and "deadlines" represent such a small proportion of total production requirements (2.7%) that they present no real problem (page 6 paragraph 4). Pressures from GPO for more timely production of NIS sections are a real problem which can be alleviated and perhaps solved entirely by the approval of a ceiling and % of [redacted] and continued authorization of overtime to work down the NIS backlog now in the plant and avoid building future backlog.

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- e. The Agency is obligated to provide (eventually in one consolidated plant) the same kinds and amounts, except for Air Force, of services the plant provided before the takeover.
- f. Consolidation of the plants would provide more efficiency and flexibility of printing operations, and would permit release of administrative and supervisory slots for production jobs.
- g. The nature of the work done in the Minin Plant precludes contracts with commercial printers. However, studies of other PSD requirements may reveal possibilities for commercial contracts for non-sensitive printing and for use of a cost-to-consumer system.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. That the Director of Logistics again request GPO to provide detailed personnel to the Minin Plant on the basis of a mutually satisfactory agreement. (This has been done since this recommendation was first made.)

- b. That the Director of Logistics in collaboration with the Comptroller explores all practical cost-to-consumer systems, including a revolving fund, as a means of reducing overall printing services requirements (this has now been started) (Management Staff will assist if desired).
- c. That the DD/S authorize release of 2 of the 9 frozen slots in the Admin Plant, approve an effective minimum working ceiling of [REDACTED] for this plant and approve the attached T/O (TAB L); this to be done with the understanding that the 3 remaining frozen slots not appear on the T/O but be held in reserve pending the development of more experience in this plant.
- d. That the Director of Logistics continue to authorize overtime for the Admin. Plant to the extent necessary to reduce the backlog in the plant to 100 sections and maintain it at that level.
- e. That, other than the above recommendations, no further action be taken at this time in order to allow time for the atypical situation which developed in 1957 to be remedied; that Management Staff be directed to monitor this situation; and, after a suitable length of time (not to exceed one year), report back to the DD/S regarding the extent to which the problems in the Admin. Plant have been solved and the desirability of any further changes.

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20 MAR 1958  
[REDACTED]

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Management Staff

Attachments:

1D - TABS A thru L

CONCERNED BY:

SIGNED

20 MAR 1958

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DIRECTOR OF LOGISTICS

[REDACTED]

The recommendations in Paragraph c above are approved.

SIGNED

L.M. WILDE  
Deputy Director (Support)



Distribution:

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1 - March 1958

